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基于分成制的供应链合同设计与道德风险 被引量:7

The Studies of Contract Design, Motivation Mechanism and Moral Hazard When the Supply Chain Is Dependent on The Divided Mechanism
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摘要 考虑一个由制造商与分销商组成的供应链,制造商通过广告投入拉动产品销售,分销商通过促销活动推动产品销售。文章建立了由一个制造商和两个分销商基于分成制合同所构成的供应链模型。首先我们给出了两分销商的Nash均衡结果和制造商与分销商间的Nash均衡结果,然后解决了供应链中的最优合同设计问题,最后通过支付函数的全微分,揭示了供应链中的道德风险问题,证明了供应链内部存在囚徒困境现象。 The type ot supply chain made up ot manufacturer ano retauer ms formalized, distributor promote sale by advertisement and sales promotion. The supply chain model is set up when one manufacturer and two distributors depend on the divided mechanism. Firstly, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the two distributors, and the Nash equilibrium of manufacturer and distributors. Then, we solve the optimal contracts design of supply chain. Lastly, from pay function's differential, moral hazard between manufacturer and distributors is discovered, thus proving that' Prisoners' Dilemma' is existed in the supply chain.
作者 姜荣
机构地区 南通大学商学院
出处 《南通大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 2005年第3期42-44,共3页
关键词 供应链 分成制 博弈 合同 道德风险 Supply chain Divided mechanism Game theory Contract Moral hazard
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参考文献5

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