从一个“搭便车”模型看股市并购中的财富效应

From A Free-rider Model to Study The Wealth Effect of Takeover of Listed Companies

文章的模型显示:由于股市中"搭便车"行为的存在,并购事件是不会发生的。因为收购者不能从价值升值中获得任何好处,股市中的散户投资者的搭便车行为,攫取了收购者的全部的价值的升值。解决该搭便车问题的可能性方案是进行股权稀释:在公司成立之初,编写相应的公司章程,允许收购者一旦接管该公司,有权稀释那些没有转让股权的股份。

This article＇s model shows that due to the free-rider behavior in stock market, takeover will never succeed. The raiders are unable to derive any benefit from the value enhancement because free-riding by dispersed shareholders fully captures the raider＇s value enhancement. A possible solution to the free-rider problem is to write a corporate charter that allows the raider, once he takes over the firm, to dilute the share value of the non-tendering shareholders.