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不良贷款、路径依赖与中小企业的融资困难——对当前我国中小企业融资难的一种新解释 被引量:7

Non-performance Loan, Path Dependence and the Financing Difficulty of SMEs-an Explanation on the Financing Difficulty of China SMEs
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摘要 关于中小企业在经济发展中所占据的重要地位及作用在理论界早已形成较为一致的看法并为各国政府所重视。目前,虽然中小企业与金融机构之间已经普遍建立起了较为稳定的合作关系,但中小企业的融资难问题仍然是制约中小企业发展的最大瓶颈。本文根据转型时期我国银行和企业的基本特征,建立了一个包括家庭—企业—银行的三部门两期模型,从我国国有银行的体制利弊出发,运用路径依赖的理论,对不良贷款在造成我国中小企业融资困难时的作用机理进行了深入分析,并讨论了单纯的贸易部门开放和贸易金融部门的同时开放对解决中小企业融资难的不同效果,以期对将来的改革有所启示。 The important role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in economic development has been recognized by scholars and governments. At present, SMEs have stable cooperation with financial institutions. However, the financing difficulty of such firms still remains the bottle-neck for their development. This paper develops a two-phase model of family, enterprise and bank based on the characteristics of the banks and firms in the transitional process. Applying the path dependence theory and from the systemic drawbacks of China state banks, we analyze in depth the mechanism of the non-performance loans on SMEs financing problem. Finally, we discuss the effects of the opening of pure trade sector and trade and financial sectors on the solving of SMEs financing problem and make some policy suggestions.
作者 王博
出处 《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第5期31-38,共8页 Modern Economic Science
关键词 不良贷款 中小企业 路径依赖 对外开放 Non-performance loan SMEs Path dependence Openness
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