摘要
运用寻租经济学的分析方法,本文对经济转型时期地方官员腐败和公共投资效率两者之间的内在关联进行了综合研究,结合中国情形进行简要的实证分析,指出基于转型时期有效监管制度的缺失,腐败对地方政府公共投资的规模效率、结构效率以及产出效率都产生了不同程度的负面效应。也就是说,作为带有高成本特性的一种“暗税”,腐败租金的存在不仅会导致区域内私人投资偏离社会期望的适度投资率,也会人为增大区域公共投资规模、扭曲区域公共投资结构,并降低区域内公共投资的产出水平。
By the analytical method of rent seeking, the paper discusses synthetically the impact of corruption on public investment efficiency of local government, and provides some evidence of China. We find that corrnptive behaviors of local rentseekers can not only cause an increase in inefficient local-government public investments, but also result in an insufficient supply of regional private investments. As a kind of arbitrary “Hidden Taxation”, corruption of local government officials distorts the public investment structure as well as causes a decrease in the output efficiency of public investments.
关键词
腐败
地方政府
公共投资
效率
corruption
local government
public investment
efficiency
