国有企业控制权收益与最优重组契约

Control Benefits and Optimal Restructuring Contracts in State-owned Enterprises

本文研究了国有企业经营者控制权收益与企业最优重组契约之间的关系。控制权收益的存在使企业内生的重组行为不足,但作为外部企业的兼并需求则过度。如果经营者的控制权收益可以进行交易和货币补偿,则企业的最优重组契约能够实现企业价值的最大化。

This paper studies the impacts of control benefits on the optimal restructuring contracts in the state-owned enterprises. Because of the existence of control benefits, the enterprise does not have enough endogenous demands for restructuring, while it has excess demands for acquisition as an outsider, The value of the enterprise can be maximized only if the manager＇s control benefit is tradable or can be compensated.