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公共物品供给模式选择与政府行为负外部性的防范 被引量:10

The Supply Model of Public Goods and Defence of Government Activity's Externalities
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摘要 在国内,政府行为外部性问题是一个全新的课题。在国外,对政府行为外部性的探讨则始于20世纪60年代,公共选择学派及其后的经济学家在质疑政府干预微观经济有效性的讨论中,逐渐形成了政府行为的外部性理论。由于政府在公共决策、提供公共物品的过程中产生了大量的负外部性,为克服和防范这种负外部性导致的政府失灵,发达国家公共物品的供给出现市场化和民营化趋势。在我国,改革公共物品的供给体制、正确定位政府职能是克服和防范政府行为负外部性的有效途径。 In China, externalities in government is a brand new subject. However, research on this field of study began to appear in 1960s. Public Choice School and the subsequent scientists gradually developed the theory of externalities in government through the research and discussion of the efficiency of government's control over micro-economy. The tremendous negative externality in the process of making public choices and supplying public goods leads to government inefficiency. In order to solve this problem, in developed countries, public goods are directly supplied by market itself. In China, reforming the supply system of public goods and helping government function properly are the effective approaches in solving the negative externality in government.
作者 蔡彤
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第16期92-96,共5页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金 广东省哲学社会科学十五规划03-04年年度项目(项目批准号03104C1-01)的阶段性成果
关键词 政府行为 外部性 公共物品 供给模式 government activity externalities public goods supply model
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献17

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