会计信息披露政策选择的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Enterprise Accounting Information Disclosure Policy Alternation

会计政策选择是作为理性“经济人”主体的企业的必然行为,不仅能为企业带来一定的经济利益,而且又影响企业利益相关者的经济利益。在委托-代理方式下,由于信息的不对称性和利益的驱使,会计政策选择带有明显的博弈特征。所以,研究会计信息披露政策选择问题,揭示会计信息披露政策的博弈主体及其行为特征、博弈过程,推导出博弈均衡,具有非常重要的意义。

As the inevitable behavior of enterprise, rational “economic entity”, accounting policy choice can not only bring certain economic benefits to enterprises but also influence the economic benefits of the relatives of enterprises. Under the way of trust-procurator, accounting policy choice appears obvious games characteristics because of information asymmetry and interests drive. Therefore, it is significant to study accounting information disclosure policy choice to disclose behavior characteristics and procedure of game entities of accounting information disclosure policy, further deducing to game equilibrium.