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国有企业经营者最优激励契约设计

Design of optimum incentive agreement of state-owned enterprise operators
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摘要 国有企业所有者追求资产保值增值,追求国有资产效益最大化,企业经营者也希望自身效益最大化;但所有者与经营者的效用最大化目标往往是不一致的,因此,所有者必须设计一个经营者能够接受的契约,使所有者与经营者的效用都达到最大化水平。所有者需要了解经营者的才能,尽可能多的掌握各种效用水平下经营者对工作努力程度选择的偏好和对闲暇需求的偏爱,只有这样,所有者才能有效激发经营者的工作热情,获取经营者努力工作带来的正面效应,避免或减小因其过多的闲暇需求产生的负面效应,避免自身利益受损。 The owner of state-owned enterprise pursues value preservation and appreciation and pursues maximization of benefit of state-run assets. Operators of the enterprises hope that their own benefit is maximized. But utility maximization goal between the owner and the operator is often inconsistent. So, the owner must design the agreement that an operator can accept and can make the utility of the owner and operator reach the maximization of utility. The owner needs to understand the operator's ability as many as possible to grasp operator hard-working partiality and preference for the demand at leisure under various kinds of utility level, only in this way, the owner could encourage the operator's working enthusiasm effectively, obtain front effect of operator, avoid or reduce negative effect led by much leisure and prevent one's own interests from being damaged.
作者 张宁
出处 《重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版)》 2005年第4期64-67,共4页 Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:Social Science Edition
关键词 经营者 激励契约 设计 operator incentive agreement design
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