摘要
The influence of ISP＇s （ internet service provider） forging on static pricing scheme for priority services is analyzed. If lSP is honest, besides the price, after users enter the network market, it can＇t affect the market; if it forges, it can change its utility. The economical analysis proves that forging is possible, when ISP gains more than its loss, ISP will take the action. In response to forging, users may adapt their traffic allocation vectors to maximize their net benefit. If users will submit more traffic or in higher priority service class, ISP gains from the behavior, if users will submit less traffic or even exits the market, ISP＇s utility decrease. The market is completely different from before, forging changes the market. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results. At the same time, how the utility function and the willingness to pay affect forging is discussed.
The influence of ISP＇s （ internet service provider） forging on static pricing scheme for priority services is analyzed. If lSP is honest, besides the price, after users enter the network market, it can＇t affect the market; if it forges, it can change its utility. The economical analysis proves that forging is possible, when ISP gains more than its loss, ISP will take the action. In response to forging, users may adapt their traffic allocation vectors to maximize their net benefit. If users will submit more traffic or in higher priority service class, ISP gains from the behavior, if users will submit less traffic or even exits the market, ISP＇s utility decrease. The market is completely different from before, forging changes the market. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results. At the same time, how the utility function and the willingness to pay affect forging is discussed.
