有限合伙制风险基金管理者的激励机制

Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capitalist in Limited Partnership

在有限合伙制风险基金中,基金管理者和投资者之间存在着委托代理关系,基金管理者的风险补偿主要源于基金的管理费用和附带权益。对于不同发展阶段的风险投资基金,由于基金管理者水平及其环境的差异等因素,风险补偿机制的形式与程度也不同。文中通过模型分析了对于新创立的风险基金和发展阶段基金其基金管理者的有效激励问题,以提高投资者对基金监管的质量和效率。

There is a principal-agent relation among venture capitalists and investors in the venture capital limited partnership. The compensation for venture capitalists are fixed and variable pay. For different development phase of venture fund, because of some factors such as different level of venture capitalist and environment change, the form and degree of venture compensation mechanism also differ. The paper estabhshes a model about new and development phase of venture fund to analyse incentive mechanism of venture capitalists and to advance quality and efficiency of investors＇ fund oversight.