摘要
本文在认沽权证和认购权证下对非流通股股东和流通股股东基于自身利益最大化在权证市场和股票市场上进行了博弈分析;通过分析,从理论上验证了引入权证在我国股权分置改革中的可行性,并且也指出了在理性的假设下非流通股股东设计权证的最佳策略和流通股股东在权证市场和股票市场上最佳投资组合,同时也为市场监管者提出了相应的监管建议。
This paper analyses the interests' game with non-negotiable stock shareholder and circulating stock shareholder in the warrant and stock market. So for , it is proved theoretically that it is feasibility that warrant is utilized solving the Problem of Equity Separation , and pointed out non-negotiable shareholder's best tactics of designing warrant and the circulating shareholder's best portfolios in the warrant and stock market under getting reasonable assumption, and put forward the corresponding supervision suggestion for market surpervision person .
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第9期19-23,45,共6页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
权证
股权分置
博弈
Warrant Equity separation Game