论G.E.摩尔的“自然主义谬误”

On G. E. Moore's "the Naturalistic Fallacy"

“自然主义谬误”是G.E.摩尔对传统伦理学的颠覆性判决。他认为这一错误的实质在于:首先,传统伦理学总是给不可定义的下定义;其次,它们又总是把价值归结为事实。摩尔的论证既有逻辑分析,又运用了独特的“开放问题”检验法。当然,摩尔的批判是有重大缺陷的,因为他对事实与价值关系的解决仍然是形而上学的、不彻底的;马克思的实践观为解决这一历史问题提供了科学的途径。

The naturalistic fallacy is a judgment of G. E. Moore that subverted the traditional ethics; he thought the essence of this mistake lies in that, at first, the traditional ethics always define things that can＇ t be defined, second, they also always give value back to fact. Moore＇s arguments had logic analysis, and he used the method of an unique test of an open question. Of course, Moore＇ s critiques have vital defects, because his resolution on the relation of fact and value is still metaphysical and not thorough; Marx＇ s view of practice has given a scientific way for resolving this historical question.