区域经济增长中地方政府行为分析

Local Government Behavior in Regional Economic Growth

在计划经济体制下,因为缺乏利益基础和独立的权力,地方政府也就缺乏制度创新和发展经济的内在动力。在经济体制改革初期,地方政府是制度的供给者和需求者,从而推动制度创新和经济增长。在当前转轨时期,地方政府扮演了上级政府的下级执行机关与区域经济的组织者、经济管理主体与经济利益主体的双重角色。其双重角色的困惑,造成了经济行为的扭曲。

Having no individual interest and independent power, local governments in China have no impetus to innovate institution and develop economy in traditional planned economy. In the primary stage of reform and opening up, local governments play as enactors of central government and organizers of regional economy, managing the economy and representing local economic interest. However, the conflict in the two roles induces the reduction of willingly institution supply, bringing distortion and contradiction in government＇s goal and economic behavior.