摘要
代理人拥有私人信息是传统委托代理理论的分析范式,在委托代理关系中也会出现大量的知情委托人情形。对于知情委托人情形仍然采用传统的委托代理分析范式,很难圆满地解释现实中委托人拥有私人信息的诸多问题,因此,研究知情委托人范式有着重要的理论前景。
出处
《天津社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期75-78,共4页
Tianjin Social Sciences
参考文献13
-
1R.B. Myerson, "Optimal Auction Design", Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 1981 ,pp. 58～73.
-
2D.P. Baron and R.B. Myerson, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs", Econometrica, 1982,50(4), pp. 911 ～ 930.
-
3J.J. Laffont and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal - Agent Model, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 86.
-
4D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, p. 186.
-
5R.B. Myerson, "Mechanism Design By an Informed Principal"Econometrica, Vol. 51, No . 6, 1983, pp. 1767～1769; E.Maskin and J. Tirole, "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, The Case of Private Values", Econometrica, 1990(58), pp. 379～409; E. Maskin and J. Tirole , "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal Ⅱ:Common Values", Econometrica, 1992(60), pp. 1～42.
-
6汪天喜.权威分配和信息传递[J].经济学（季刊）,2003,3(1):217-236. 被引量：5
-
7Lucia Quesada, "Informed Principal in the Private Value Framework: A Simplified Version, Game Theory and Information", Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. , 2002.
-
8P. Beaudry, "Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent", International Economic Review, 35 (4),1994,pp. 821～832.
-
9Eric W. Bond and Thomas A. Gresik,"Competition Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals",Economic Theory, 1997(10),pp. 227～240.
-
10Rolf Tisljar, "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model", Bonn Econ Discussion Papers., 2002, 21.
二级参考文献35
-
1Bolton, P and M Dewatrlpont. "The Firm as a communication Network", Quarterly Journal Economics, 1994, 109, 809-839.
-
2Crawford, Vincent, P and J Sobel. "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982, 50,1431-1451.
-
3Dessein, W. "Authority and Communication in Organizations", Manuscript, University of Chicago,2001.
-
4Downs, A. "An Economic Theory of Democracy", Harper & Rowe, Cambridge, UK, 1957.
-
5Garicano, Luis. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108, 874-904.
-
6Grossman, Sanford J and Oliver Hart. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, 691-719.
-
7Hart, Oliver and Jean Tirole. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics", Review of Economic Studies, 1988, 55, 509-540.
-
8Holmstrom, B. "On the Theory of Delegation", in Boyer, M. and R. E. Kihlstrom ed Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science Publisher B V, 1984.
-
9Holmstrom, B and R B Myerson. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 1983, 51, 1799-1819.
-
10Laffont, J J and D Martimort. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information", Econometrica, 1997,65, 875-911.
共引文献4
-
1姜涛,宗计川.科层体制下公司创业中权力斗争与协调[J].科学管理研究,2008,26(1):91-94. 被引量：1
-
2韩中元,管毅平.利益分歧、有成本交流与内生权威[J].经济学（季刊）,2014,13(1):583-600. 被引量：2
-
3原超,李妮.地方领导小组的运作逻辑及对政府治理的影响——基于组织激励视角的分析[J].公共管理学报,2017,14(1):27-37. 被引量：86
-
4刘自敏,杨丹.劳动力甄别中最优试用期合同的决定[J].珞珈管理评论,2010(1):63-69.
同被引文献17
-
1苏晓华.企业治理之租金视角研究——一个理论框架及其在高科技企业中的应用[J].中国工业经济,2004(7):84-90. 被引量：15
-
2青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2001..
-
3Des.s, Lumpkin, Covin. Entrepreneurial strategy making and firm performalnce tests of contingency and configurational models[ J ] . Strategic Management Journal, 1997,18 (9) : 677 - 695.
-
4朱博涌,等.衍生公司绩效的影响因素探讨-以宏基集团衍生公司为例[D].创业研究与教育国际研讨会论文.
-
5Sanford J. Grossman, S. , Oliver D. Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, vol. 94,691 - 719.
-
6Tirole, T., Corporate Governance, Econometrica, 2001, 69(1):1-35.
-
7Vijay b. Nair. Corporate Governance and Internal Organization. 2004[D]. workingpaper The Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research the Wharton School University of Pennsylvania.
-
8Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization[J]. The American Economic Review, 1972,62 (5) : 777 - 795.
-
9Raghuram G. Rajan& Luigi Zingales. The Governance of the New Enterprise[R]. NBER Working Papers, 7958, 2000.
-
10Luigi Zingales. Corporate Governance[R]. NBER Working Paver ,6309 ,December, 1997.
-
1于丽娜.高校图书馆读者服务中的委托代理问题分析[J].科技情报开发与经济,2009,19(29):28-30. 被引量：2
-
2马子麟.对新企业的赞助及其生存能力[J].管理观察,1994,0(8):3-3.
-
3冯丽.基于信息经济学视角的学科馆员激励机制研究[J].河北科技图苑,2015,28(5):34-36.
-
4鄢仁秀,汪贤裕,郭红梅.供应链中的知情委托方契约机制设计[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(4):971-978.
-
5王茜,刘新燕.基于委托代理理论的图书馆联盟研究[J].图书馆学研究,2015(2):80-82.
-
6黄谛.个人信息管理研究述评[J].科技情报开发与经济,2009,19(24):112-115. 被引量：2
-
7任广乾.公司治理道德风险的起源及其机制设计——基于契约不完全的视角[J].技术经济与管理研究,2014(10):51-55.
-
8热词[J].课堂内外（高中版）（A版）,2014,0(12):16-17.
-
9张汉江,李超,刘洋.研究开发活动中委托代理关系的建模与分析[J].系统工程,1999,17(5):7-12. 被引量：4
-
10李玲.图书馆工作中的委托代理关系研究[J].科技情报开发与经济,2009,19(14):18-20.
