摘要
运用博弈理论分析中国收入差距与社会稳定问题有一定意义。在具有公平因素偏好的效用函数基础上分析社会低收入阶层决策对收入差距敏感程度的影响;在重复博弈中引入不同策略收益的增长率,分析社会低收入阶层在三阶段动态博弈中采取偏离子博弈完美均衡的非理性斗争策略的具体条件:其取决于收入差距敏感程度、自身收入的增长(变化)率和各社会阶层采取不同策略的预期收益等因素。
This paper analyses the Chinese income disparity and social stability problems used the game theory. Based on the utility function considering fairness, it analyses that the social low income population's sensitive degree of income disparity has effect on their decision. By the way of replaced the discount rate in repeated game by the income growth rate, it analyzes the condition that the social low income population takes the non -rational battle strategy departure from sub-game perfect equihbrium in dynamic game, that are decided by sensitive degree of income disparity, income growth rate and different expected incomes that social estates take the different strategies under the current system.
出处
《经济与管理》
2005年第10期13-15,共3页
Economy and Management
关键词
收入差距
社会稳定
动态博弈
非子博弈完美均衡
income disparity
social stability
dynamic game
out of sub -game perfect equilibrium