结构性制度约束、监督成本与98粮改政策效应——中国近期粮价波动之启示

Structural System Restraint,Supervision Cost and 1998 Grain Reform Effect——A Review on Recent Grain Price Fluctuation in China

通过对粮食收购和销售两个阶段所面临的消费结构变化、结构性制度结构约束、过度生产以及市场竞争特性的考察分析,发现在1998年粮食流通体制之外,市场机制却悄然地发挥着调节作用。同时,通过建构的监管博弈模型进行分析,发现维持现行粮食流通体制的监管成本极其高昂且无效率,并由此认为,一方面,当一个社会的市场化程度发展到一定水平之后,整个经济体制所形成的市场化制度结构会约束非市场化部门的非市场化行为;另一方面,当维持非市场化行为的成本极其高昂时,非市场化部门会主动选择市场化行为。

Based on the investigation and analysis of the change of consumption structure, structural system restraint, overproduction and market competitive characteristics during the grain purchase and sale stages, it is discovered that apart from the 1998 grain circulation system, the market mechanism has played an adjusting role quietly. From the analysis by making the supervision game model, at the same time, it is found that the supervision cost for maintaining the current grain circulation system is not only extremely high but inefficient as well. It is then considered that, on the one hand, when the market-orientation degree of a society has reached a certain level, the market-based system formed by the entire economic system will restrain the non-market-oriented behavior of the non-market-oriented departments ; on the other hand, when the cost to maintain the nonmarket-oriented behavior is extremely high, the non-market-oriented departments will choose the market-oriented behavior voluntarily.