基于Stackelberg博弈的WCDMA网络收益最大化计费的研究

On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game

该文研究了在WCDMA网络中如何选择价格来最大化网络收益。没有采用拥塞相关的计费,而是对每个用户有效传输的单位吞吐量收取固定的费用,但每个用户的传输速率是网络拥塞和单位带宽价格的函数,并在此基础上提出了用户净效用函数。利用Stackelberg博弈,建模网络与用户之间的交互,即一方面网络管理者设定价格, 以便实现收益最大化,而用户通过自优化效用函数来寻找新的均衡点对此做出响应。本文提供了网络收益与接纳用户数目的定量关系,并研究了网络降低用户传输速率以增大网络容量和拥塞控制的经济动机。

The problem that how to set the price to maximize revenue in WCDMA networks is investigated in this paper. Instead of adopting congestion pricing mechanism, this paper imposes fixed usage price on throughput of each user, which is assumed to be the function of network congestion and usage cost. Based on above assumptions, the net utility functions of users are provided and Stackelberg game is adopted to model the interaction between network and users. That is, network sets the price to maximize revenue, and in response to the price, users maximize their net utility functions to achieve equilibriums. The paper provides the quantitative relation between revenue and the number of admitted users, and infers that although, technically speaking, network can increase system capacity to admit more users through decreasing transmission rate of users, the network has no incentive to adopt this policy. Conversely, network has the incentive to pert＇arm congestion control.