集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Implicit Contract about Unit Cooperation within Cluster

以弹性化和专业化为主要特点的集群内企业的合作是集群得以健康发展的关键。要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。在新制度经济学的视角下,当企业选择签订长期契约代替一体化经营时,可以采用显性契约和隐性契约两种方案。由于契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性,提高了显性契约的实施成本。因此,基于集群企业间合作的隐性契约在规范集群企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文运用完全信息和不完全信息下的动态博弈理论对防止集群企业机会主义行为的隐性契约进行了博弈分析,阐释了隐性契约运行的内在机理,并在此基础上对如何规范集群内企业的合作行为提出了具有实践指导和可操作性的政策建议。

The key of the sound development of the cluster lies in unit cooperation focusing on flexibility and specification within a cluster. Moreover,a powerful institutional guarantee must be established for efficient cooperation between various units. From the perspective of new institutional economics,if a firm decides to take long-term contact instead of integration operation,both explicit and implicit contract can be available. However,due to the insufficiency of the contract and the future uncertainty,the implementation cost of explicit contract is to increase a lot. By contract,the implicit contract provides forceful guarantee for regulating business activity of a cluster. Based on this point,the paper gives a game analysis on how implicit contract prevent opportunism activity of cluster units through dynamic game theory under condition of full information disclosure and non-full information disclosure. Also it explains the essential mechanism of implicit contract operation. Furthermore,on the basis of above-mentioned analysis,this paper presents some suggestions on how to regulate the cooperation within a cluster.