解雇威胁条件下经营者风险分担与激励设计

Manager's Risk-Sharing and Incentive Design in Termination Menace

本文分析了解雇威胁条件下的经营者风险分担和激励设计问题。将企业产出线性函数中的能力因子扩展为经营者的人力资本变量;同时将解雇威胁定量化,把解雇概率植入到参与约束和激励相容约束条件中求得存在解雇威胁时的经营者分成合约分享系数的隐性方程。通过对这些方程的比较静态分析得出努力程度和人力资本变量与分享系数及解雇成本的关系,解释了隐性激励与显性激励之间的替代性,并就如何提高我国经理人市场的隐性激励效率,替代控制权激励并完善相关制度环境提出了政策建议。

This paper analyzes the problem of manager＇s risk- sharing and incentive design in termination menace. This research expands linear agent - principal incentive model through substituting measurable human capital for ability＇s factor in enterprise productive linear function. At the same time this paper figures out recessive function of sharing coefficient in sharing contract through transplanting termination probability in agent - principal participation constrains and incentive compatibility conditions. We draw the relationship among effort, human capital variable,sharing coefficient and termination cost, and explain substitution between explicit incentive and implicit incentive,on basis of which we put forth policy suggestion of substitution market recessive incentive for control recessive incentive and perfecting relevant institution circumstance for improving the efficientcy of incentive contract.