基于合作溢出的战略联盟不稳定性研究

A Study on Instabilities of Strategic Alliance Based upon Cooperative Spillovers

战略联盟的不稳定性与专有核心资源的共享及其溢出有关。在一个专业化理论模型中,专有核心资源共享和溢出能够带来专业化分工的经济性和成员核心竞争力的提升,这同时打破了事前的竞争力平衡状态,从而引发了成员间争夺和防护最大化溢出的合作冲突。在信息对称的情况下,战略联盟是一个“囚犯困境”,不稳定性由这一博弈的均衡结果来反映,而在信息不对称时,最优溢出量的相机决策建立在对对方溢出量的预期和事先竞争力对比的基础上,由于联盟成员之间的激励不相容,当合作变成不可置信承诺以及市场价格波动时,联盟也是不稳定的。

Instabilities of strategic alliances relate to sharing of proprietary core resources.A specialization theory model indicates that spillovers with the core resources sharing can break ex balance of competition, although it can bring economies of division to and enhance competion abilities of alliances members. Thus it brings the inherent tension between cooperation and competition in alliances, and also causes to alliances instabilities simultaneity. When information is symmetric, the cooperative conflict which causes instabilities to alliances can be described by a“prisoner＇s dilemma”, and when information is asymmetric,optimal spillover is a result of the contingent decision based on the anticipation for spillover levels of other member＇s and the ex ante competitive ability ratio. Because of incentive incompatibility,when cooperation isn＇t a believed commitment and when the prices in market undulate, alliances disintegrate.