井冈山时期第三次反“会剿”几个问题之我见

On Several Questions of the Third "Anti-encirclement-and suppression" in the Jinggang Mountains Period

长期以来,史学界对井冈山时期的革命斗争史用力甚勤,成果颇丰。但也有不少问题需作进一步探讨,比如,彭德怀率领红五军下山是继红四军主力出发赣南之后的又一次“战略引退”,而不是标明井冈山保卫战的失败,更不是“弃守逃跑”;“围魏救赵”是“柏露会议”最后决策的,但此前已经多次提出,此后又召开过一系列重要会议加以贯彻落实;“围魏救赵”决策有得也有失,即在战略上是积极的、主动的,在战术上又是不完全可取的。

For a long time, the historiography scholars have tried their best to study the revolutionary struggle history in the period of the Jinggang Mountains, and have made rich achievements. But there are many questions to be explored further. For example, after the 4th Red Army went to the south of Jiangxi ,Peng Dehuai led the 5th Red Army to leave the mountains and it was a retreat strategy, not indicating that the defence war of the Jinggang Mountains failed and the army fled from the mountain. The decision of ＂relieving the beseiged by besieging the base of the besiegers＂ was made in the ＂Boluo Meeting＂ ,but in fact,it had been proposed many times before. And in order to carry out the decision, a series of important meetings were held later. There were benefits and failures in complimenting the decision of ＂relieving the beseiged by besieging the base of the besiegers＂. It was right to take the positive, initiative strategy, but was not totally desirable on tactics.