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国有商业企业管理弱化的经济博弈分析

The Economics Analysis of Management Weakening in State-Owned Commercial Enterprises Based on Game Theory
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摘要 本文采用博弈理论和方法从国有商业企业治理的角度出发,探讨了国有商业企业管理弱化问题。文章认为,国有商业企业由于治理结构不完善,政府与国有商业企业之间一般都存在合谋作弊行为,这种局面将最终造成政府对国有商业企业管理的弱化。要克服管理弱化,应尽量降低监控成本,提高监督效率和创新能力;加大违规损失,增大违规风险,提高奖励力度,奖惩并用提高监督效率;谨防出现内部人控制情况,在监督机制设计中必须做到监控主体到位。 From the angle of commercial enterprises governing, the author probes into the problems with state-owned commercial enterprises with the help of game theory and approaches. Because of the imperfections in state-owned commercial enterprises governing structure,the problem of collusion exists between the government and state-owned commercial enterprises, which in turn leads to management weakening. To conquer this problem, we should, first, do our best to lower the cost of supervision, improve the efficiency of supervision and the ability of innovation; second, increase the loss and risk of violation; third, take precautions against insider control.
作者 周兵
出处 《中国流通经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第9期34-36,共3页 China Business and Market
关键词 国有商业企业 治理结构 纳什均衡 重复博弈 State-owned commercial enterprises governing structure nash equilibrium repeated game
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