摘要
利益分配机制是虚拟研发组织治理结构的核心组成部分。本文通过构建一个盟主两个成员的双代理人委托代理模型,比较研究虚拟研发组织中利益分配的分成制与带有“团队惩罚”的分配机制对盟员最优研发投入的影响;并将虚拟研发组织的利益分配和激励措施结合起来,提高盟员的研发投入水平,促使虚拟组织的最终收益产出达到Pareto最优。
Benefit sharing is one of the core elements of governance structure in virtual R＆D organization. This paper aims at doing comparative analysis on the impact on member＇ s effort by the benefit sharing between sharecropping and group fine, via establishing a principal - agent model with one - principal and two - agency. Meanwhile, incentive for members to put effort as more as pareto efficient on collaborative R＆D is discuss in this paper.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期127-131,共5页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"虚拟研发组织运行机制与治理结构理论与实证研究"(项目编号:70271009)资助(2003.1-2005.12)
