股权分置与大股东权力寻租的治理

Stock Right Disposition and Administration of Big Shareholder's Power Seeking and Renting

我国股市的股权分置制度和公司治理制度的不完善,导致了上市公司的非流通股股东利用本身绝对控股的权力,进行权力寻租,侵蚀上市公司利益,损害其他股东权益,导致我国资本市场的低效率。本文提出了建立起针对投融资人的资信评价体系;以新带老,缩小流通股与非流通股价差;加强公司内部治理制度和证券市场监管等措施,规范非流通股股东行为,防止大股东权力寻租的一些方法。

The faulty stock right disposition system and faulty corporate controllable system in China have caused the non-negotiable stock shareholders of public companies to make use of their own absolutely controllable stock right to do power seeking and renting, thus damaging the benefits of both public companies and other shareholders, and producing inefficient capital market in China. This essay puts forward such measures as setting up credit appraisal system aimed at investors and financiers, reducing price difference of negotiable stocks and non-negotiable stocks, strengthening corporate controllable system and stock market supervision, standardizing the behavior of non-negotiable stock shareholders, and preventing big shareholders from power seeking and renting.