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创业投资家报酬激励机制的缺陷分析与对策研究 被引量:4

A Study on the Defaults and Countermeasures of Venture Capitalists' Reward Incentive Mechanism
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摘要 高素质的创业投资家是创业投资的灵魂,对创业投资家的激励具有重要的意义。在对创业投资家的“分成”报酬激励机制进行了分析后,了解了在投资者最大化收益时,创业投资家所付出的努力水平没有达到投资者所希望的水平,所以它并不是一种有效的激励机制。只有通过期权和声誉激励方式来提高创业投资家的努力水平,才能使其两者目标效用函数趋于一致。 High - quality venture capitalists is the soul of venture capital, so it is significant to incite venture capitalists,The paper analyzes the mechanism of prompting “sharecropping” for venture capitalists, and concludes that such a mechanism is not an effective incentive one, because as investors achieve maximal benefits, venture capitalists fail to meet the their expectation,It proposes that this can be improved by means of incentive stock option and reputation, which may result in the accordance of the mutual utility functions.
出处 《商业研究》 北大核心 2005年第19期97-99,共3页 Commercial Research
关键词 创业投资家 报酬激励 股票期权 声誉 venture capitalist reward incentive stock option reputation
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共引文献35

同被引文献26

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