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供应链中合作广告策略的Stackelberg微分对策模型 被引量:6

Stackelberg Differential Game Model for Cooperative Advertising Strategies in Supply Chain
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摘要 研究由单一制造商与单一零售商组成的供应链系统中的动态合作广告策略.制造商作为渠道的领导者设计动态广告支持计划优化和协调自身以及追随者零售商的广告策略.双方都可做长期和短期广告,制造商为零售商的2种类型的广告支付一定比例的成本.用Stackelberg微分对策模型描述制造商与零售商的动态广告策略,并根据动态规划原理求出反馈Stackelberg均衡解.结果显示,制造商对零售商的广告支持类型取决于双方的边际利润.在合作广告计划中双方的均衡广告策略中,制造商主要做长期广告以构建品牌商誉,零售商在制造商的支持下主要做短期广告以刺激销售.合作广告是供应链中的一种协调机制,可以提高零售商对制造商的战略跟随意愿. Dynamic cooperative advertising strategies in a supply chain with a single manufacture and an exclusive retailer were studied. The manufacture acts as the channel leader to design and implement a dynamic advertising program to support advertising effort of the retailer to optimize his own and the retailer's profit, They may make advertising expenditures on both short and long term advertising. The manufacture pays a certain costs of the retailer for advertising. Stackelberg differential game model was used to describe the strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer. The stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium was characterized using dynamic programming principle. The results show that the types of advertising of the retailer supported by the manufacture are determined by the marginal profits of the both members. In the equilibrium advertising strategies, the manufacturer pays much of its attention to long term advertising to build brand goodwill, while the retailer lays stress on short term advertising to stimulate sales under the support of the manufacture. Cooperative advertising scheme is a coordinate mechanism in a supply chain that induces the retailer to follow the manufacturer.
出处 《西南交通大学学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2005年第4期513-518,共6页 Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University
关键词 供应链管理 微分对策 合作广告 反馈Stackelberg均衡 supply chain management differential game cooperative advertising feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
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