我国银行业市场约束力的实证研究(1994-2003)

An Empirical Study on Market Discipline of China's Banking Industry During 1994 - 2003

本文运用1994-2003年间的面板数据,通过估计银行存款的实际利息支出对其风险变化的反应,实证地检验了我国14家银行市场约束力的情况,估计结果表明:我国银行业的市场约束力非常微弱,大多数情形下银行的实际利息支出对其风险变化没有做出显著的反应,这种“反应迟钝”的现象在不同性质的银行间几乎没有差异,这与我们关于国家“隐性保险”几乎覆盖所有银行的发现是一致的。最后,我们指出了上述实证结论的政策含义,并讨论了本文实证分析可能存在的不足。

With a panel data of 14 commercial banks from 1994 to 2003 in China, after introducing the dummy variable of official implicit insurance, this paper aims to test these banks＇ market diseiphne with their reflection of the real interest rates to the risks. Our empirical results suggest：neither the four sate - owned banks nor the other commercial banks could find the significant evidence of market discipline, which seems to show the existence of official implicit insurance, at the same time, the official implicit insurance not ouly eovers the sate - owned banks, but all the other banks in China. The main implication for the reform of the Chinese banking is that China should give up the official impheit insurance as early as possible, and set up an explicit deposit insurance system suitable to Chinese situations.