摘要
承发包双方在合同变更中的机会主义和信息的非对称性,产生了“敲竹杠”和投资过小现象以及隐藏信息的道德风险问题。运用委托-代理理论建立了非对称信息条件下的最优承包合同模型,对上述问题进行了研究。证明在承包商隐藏信息条件下,最优承包合同将使承包商的专用投资水平下降、工程项目工期延长、业主效用降低。
The opportunism and asymmetric of information, gives birth to hold up, low-investment and moral hazard with hidden information between owner and contractor in the contract variation. This paper, using the principal-agent theory, sets up a model of optimal contracting contract under asymmetric information. We show that the optimal investment level is reduced, optimal time of the project is postponed, and utility of the owner is decreased under contractor hidden information.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第10期123-125,共3页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
关键词
隐藏信息
合同变更
承包合同
非对称信息
项目管理
hidden information
contract variation
contracting contract
asymmetric information
project management
