基于资费的网间结算理论:统一定价

Tariff-based Interconnection Pricing Theory:Uniform Pricing

在多数发展中国家,由于缺乏成本研究所必需的数据和资源,监管机构在制定网间互联政策时,通常采用一些特殊的结算规则。本文提出了不同于DT模型的基于资费的结算规则,并利用LRT模型框架分析了该结算规则。分析结果表明,网络竞争均衡的存在性取决于网络替代性和结算价格系数的大小,互联双方可能将结算价格系数作为合谋工具。与基于成本结算规则相比,当两者的结算价格相等时,基于资费结算规则具有更低的均衡零售价格,这意味着基于资费结算规则强化了零售市场价格竞争。

In most developing countries, some ad hoc rules are often adopted in the implementation of interconnection policy for the limited resources and data necessary to conduct relevant cost study. This paper puts forward a Tariff - based Interconnection Pricing Rule （TIPR） different from the rule in DT＇ s model, and analyzes the competitive equilibrium within LRT framework. It is shown that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large network substitutability and large Interconnection Charge Proportion Factor （ACPF） . In the region where equilibrium exists, networks may use ACPF as an instrument of collusion. Compared with Cost-based Interconnection Pricing Rule （CIPR）, TIPR intensifies network competition and has lower retail equilibrium price with the same interconnection fee.