银行监管:防范危机还是促进发展?——基于跨国数据的实证研究及其对中国的启示

Bank Supervision: Prevent Crisis or Promote Development?

危机、监管与发展是近20￣30年来世界各国经济的主旋律:银行危机此起彼伏,以防范危机为初衷的监管措施却在松与紧之间徘徊,而危机与监管对于银行业乃至整体经济发展的影响则更为繁杂。现有的文献大多割裂地对待这3个问题,尽管分析细致深入,却拥有不同的目标和前提,因此往往得出截然相反的结论,令政策制定者莫衷一是。本文选择银行监管作为问题的切入点,将银行发展作为衡量监管综合绩效的最终指标,采用世界银行2004年调查报告的最新数据,运用主成分分析法构造了12项银行监管指标,利用工具变量(IV)法和广义矩(GMM)估计对传统OLS模型进行了改进,从而验证监管措施的效应,以此对最优银行监管方案进行初步探讨。在跨国经验研究的基础上,本文还考察了中国银行监管的现状,并且通过在基本计量模型中引入交叉项的方式,检验了中国在资本充足率不高、非官方监管控制不健全的条件下,能够采用的监管方案,以此为中国银监会成立后的银行监管改革提供政策依据。

During the past thirty years, Crises, regulation and development have been the three characteristics of the world economy: bank crises rose in one country and fell in another, government supervision measures that aimed at preventing crises were shifting between tight and loose controls, and the effect of crises and supervision on banking, and even on the world economy, was more intricate than other factors. These three issues were studied respectively in the existing literature, but without considering the relationship between them: although detailed and profound, the analyses were made with different premises and served different purposes, and therefore, the conclusions made are more often than not completely different, making policy makers unable to decide which is right. We have chosen bank supervision as the starting point, used bank development as the ultimate goal indicator to gauge the integrative performance of the regulation, adopted the newest data (2004) of the findings report from the World Bank, constructed 12 bank regulatory indices with the principal component analysis, improved the traditional OLS model with the IV and GMM estimation, and thus tested and verified the effect of supervision measures, making an initial exploration of the best plan of bank control. On the basis of the study of transnational experiences, we have also investigated the status quo of the regulation of China's banks, and, by means of the introduction of the cross term into the basic econometric model, examined the supervisory scheme that China can adopt under the circumstances in which China's bank capital-asset ratio is low and non-official supervisory system is immature, and thus provided the foundation in policy for the bank's supervisory reforming after the founding of China Banking Regulatory Commission.