土地调整、地权稳定性与农民长期投资激励

Land Reallocation,Tenure Security and Long-term Investment Incentive in China's Agricultural Production

中国的家庭联产承包责任制与农业经济增长之间的关系受到了众多经济学家的关注。现有研究普遍认为土地调整破坏了农民土地使用权的稳定性,从而削弱了农民的长期投资激励。本文将农户的长期投资划分为两类,“与特定地块不相连的长期投资”以及“与特定地块相连的长期投资”,通过实证研究发现,土地调整对农户的这两类长期投资决策的影响是不同的。本文的主要结论有:“减人减地”使农户的第一类长期投资大幅度下降,“增人增地”对农户的第一类长期投资没有什么影响;“减人减地”和“增人增地”对农户的农家肥使用量都没有什么影响。但是,我们并不能把“减人减地”导致的以及大调整所可能导致的第一类长期投资的减少完全归咎于土地调整所导致的低效率。

The goal of this paper is to study the relationships among the land reallocation, tenure security and long-term investment incentives in China＇s agricultural production. In this paper, the long-term investments are first classified into two categories： not-land-attached and land-attached. The empirical results show that the reduction of land due to small-scale reallocation of land do affect the first category of long-term investment which is decreased significantly, while the increase of land do not increase the first category accordingly. On the other hand, the changes of land, i.e., the security of land tenure, have no strong relationships with use of manures. The robust finding is that the low efficiency and development in agricultural production do not attribute to the comparatively frequent reallocation of land and poor land tenure determined by the Household Responsibility System.