电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型与分析

An optimum auction model in the bilateral-monopolized power markets

我国实行“厂网分开、竞价上网”的电力改革中,形成了电网公司双边垄断模式。为与原有厂网合一、垂直一体化的完全垄断模式作效率比较,构造了国家电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型,深入分析了这种模式给电网公司、发电商和用电户带来的期望效用和社会福利水平及变化情况,结果证明改革后社会福利增加、效率提高,但仍未达到电力市场的社会最优。这表明应该坚持引入竞争的市场化改革方向,但需要打破电网公司双边垄断局面,进一步在发电、购电环节引入更充分的竞争。

As a result of the generation and the transmission of power is separated and the price is formed at a competitive market, a bilateral-monopolized market appears. To compare the efficiency with the totally monopolized original mode, this paper constructs a bilateral-monopoly auction model and analyzes the expected utility and social welfare level brought to the power transmission company, the power generator and the power consumer. It＇ s proved that the social welfare and efficiency is improved, but is not optimum. It indicates that the market-based reform should be insisted on, but the bilateral monopoly at present is not still a optimum mode and needs to break the monopoly and strengthen the competition further in the power generating and purchasing.