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人力资本、不确定性及风险投资的治理

Human Caoital. Uncertainty and the Governance of Venture Caoital
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摘要 人力资本特性对风险投资的治理机制至关重要。人力资本具有四个特性:人力资本的不可分离性、不确定性、专用性和专有性。特别是专用性和专有性之间的转化导致交易双方事后谈判力的逆转,引发投资过程中的“双边道德风险”.因而要求治理机制的相应变化。风险投资本身的特点结合人力资本的上述特性,造就了风险投资治理机制报酬合约的双重性、声誉机制的重要性、治理机制的动态性和各阶段治理机制的一体性的特征。 The characteristics of human capital are critical to governance of venture capital. Human capital has four characteristics. They are un-separated characteristic of human capital's value,the uncertainty of value in quality, specificity and exclusiveness of human capital.Specially, the transformation of specificity and exclusiveness of the human capital will lead to the change ofex post bargaining power and 'double-sides moral hazard'. Agency problems are especially serious in venture capital because of the combination of the uncertainty of human capital and that of venture capital, which causes the different characteristics of governance mechanisms of venture capital, including double-function of recompense contracts, importance of reputation mechanism, dynamics of governance mechanisms and integration of governance mechanisms in every stage.
作者 张珉 卓越
机构地区 相潭大学商学院
出处 《改革》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第11期93-98,共6页 Reform
关键词 人力资本 不确定性 风险投资 企业治理结构 企业管理 human capital, uncertainty, venture capital, governance mechanisms
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参考文献19

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