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金融管制对银行公司治理的影响 被引量:3

Financial Control's Influence on the Corporate Governance of the Bank
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摘要 本文主要探讨在管制环境下银行的公司治理问题。从世界范围来看,银行部门一个具有普遍性的特征在于其内在的脆弱性。鉴于银行部门在经济中的重要性,政府往往会对银行业实行较为严格的管制,其目的是降低系统风险以保持银行业的稳定性与完整性。管制和管制者的存在对银行的公司治理产生了重要影响:一方面,由于引入了管制者(政府或专门机构)而使银行的信息不对称结构和代理关系更加复杂;另一方面,管制改变了银行外部的公司治理结构及其功能。我们的结论是,管制是影响银行公司治理的一个重要因素,如果简单地把银行等同于一般性企业加以分析显然是不合适的。而且随着银行管制环境的变化,银行的公司治理也必须进行相应的调整,否则将出现“治理缺口”,并加大银行部门的系统风险。 The article chiefly discusses the corporate governance problem of bank under the financial control environment. There exists a common feature of inner fragility in the bank all over the world. Because of the important role of banking in economic activities, government usually gets it under finn control so as to reduce the system risk and keep the stability and integrity of banking. The existence of control and controller inserts great influence on the corporate governance structure of the bank and its functions as well. Our conclusion is that we cannot take the bank as an ordinary enterprise. Control is an important factor to the corporate govemance of the bank. To avoid the govemance gap and the increasing system risks, we should keep on adjusting the corporate governance of the bank to the changes of financial control environment.
作者 曾昭诚 朱涛
机构地区 东南大学金融系
出处 《南京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2005年第3期62-67,共6页 Journal of Nanjing Tech University:Social Science Edition
关键词 金融管制 银行 公司治理 financial control bank corporate governance
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参考文献17

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