家族企业中的歧视现象——作为非正式治理机制的歧视

Discrimination in Family Business: An Informal Governance

歧视现象普遍存在于家族企业,本文认为,歧视是家族企业在正式治理机制弱化情况下实施的一种非正式治理机制。家族企业扩张和管理的复杂化,要求雇佣高能力的外部代理人开展专业化分工,但是,现有的正式治理机制难以抑制外部代理人的寻租行为,过高的代理成本阻碍了分工的深入。业主会利用家族代理人和外部代理人共享的“准私人信息”,以及代理人之间信息租金的不同分布,根据血亲关系和私人关系在不同代理人之间实施歧视,通过给与家族代理人优厚待遇,达到抽取外部代理人的信息租金,降低代理成本的目的。

The discrimination is prevailing in family business. This paper argues discrimination is a kind of informal governance when external formal governance is weak. The expanding and management＇s complexity of family business requests to engage highly intelligent no-family agent and carry out specialized collaboration, but current external governance can＇ t restrain agent from resting. High agent cost blocks specialized collaboration. Owner can utilize “ quasi-private information” which is shared by the entire agent with the asymmetrical distributing of informational rent, and adopt discrimination among the agent according to consanguinity and personal relation. In virtue of bestowing family business favorable treatment, owner can draw out the no-family agent＇ s rent and reduce agent cost.