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控制权争夺与资本结构优化 被引量:4

Fighting for Control Rights and Capital Structure Optimization
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摘要 资本结构在企业控制权争夺中起着非常重要的作用,通过影响管理者和外部投资者的投票权分布来影响公司控制权争夺的结果。本丈认为,企业控制权的争夺将有助于降低资本成本,提高企业的价值。一套完善的约束代理人机制不能缺少兼并和接管等控制权争夺机制,尽管控制权争夺的成本可能昂贵,却为企业提供了最终的外部约束。 Capital structure plays a very important role on fighting for control rights which affect the result of fighting by affecting management and outside investor's vote rights distribution. The paper suggests that fighting for corporate control right will contribute to reducing the capital cost, and improve the corporate value. One perfect mechanism which restraints agency cost cannot lack the control rights fighting mechanism such as merger and takeover. Although the cost of fighting for control rights may be expensive, it has a final outside restraint on corporation, and can make corporate capital structure optimal.
出处 《财经论丛(浙江财经学院学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第6期7-12,共6页
关键词 控制权 资本结构 并购 企业价值 优化 control rights capital structure merge corporate value optimization
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参考文献7

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