中国地方政府财政风险研究:“逆向软预算约束”理论的视角

An Approach to the Fiscal Risk of Chinese Local Governmets

目前,中国地方政府负债所隐含的财政风险越来越严重。在将县市政府的债务重新分为主动负债和被动负债之后,本文运用“逆向软预算约束”理论来解释中国地方政府为什么会主动累积各种负债进而累积财政风险。本文认为,在目前的制度环境、官员激励机制和约束机制下,经济增长和地方政绩是以财政风险的不断增加为代价的。因此,要解决地方政府的债务问题,控制财政风险,从根本上来看需要在财政体制之外进行努力,改革目前的干部激励机制和约束机制。

Potential fiscal risk caused by indebted local government grows more and more seriously in China. Using the theory of‘adverse soft budget constraint’, the article explains the cause of the risk. The article argues that under the current institu-tional environment as well as the motivating and restrictive mechanism of cadres, economic growth and local performance go atthe cost of the increment of fiscal risk. To solve the problem, efforts are needed outside the fiscal system to reform the currentmotivating and restrictive mechanism of cadres.