环境管制政策的局限性与变革——自愿性环境政策的兴起

Limitation and Reformation of Governmental Regulation——Rise of Voluntary Environmental Policy

我国虽然基本上避免了环境质量急剧恶化的局面,但是现行环境政策并没有从根本上遏制环境状况不断恶化的趋势,我国环境政策的效率亟待提高。究其原因,我国环境政策以行政直控的管制政策为主,具有强烈的行政管理色彩,使得政府和企业的博弈长期锁定在非合作状态。要摆脱这种困境,必须引入第三方激励、监督机制,促使双方的博弈转变为合作博弈。20世纪90年代中期自愿性环境政策的渐渐兴起,是企业和公众在产品市场上互相影响的结果,而政府起到引导、激励、信号传递作用。文章从博弈论的角度对此进行了分析,自愿性环境政策缓解了环境管制成本与效果冲突的困境,是未来环境政策的一个重要的方向。

Contrasting the progress in environmental protection with that in the economic development in the meantime in China, we found that China has basically avoided a sharp worsening situation in environment quality under the pressures from its quickly moving economy and obviously increased population. But the current environmental policy is inefficient in China because it has not contained the deteriorating tendency in environmental condition as well as it works at the cost of the efficiency in resources utilization and economic benefit. The situation is due to fact that the environmental policy in China is mainly a regulation policy run strongly by governmental administration; indeed it has made the game between the government and enterprise non- cooperative for a long time. To get away from the dilemma, a system of the 3rd party stimulation and supervision must be involved, impelling the game from being non- cooperative to cooperative. In the mid 1990s, the rise of the vohmtary environmental policy was a result from the game between the public and enterprise in the market, in which the government plays the role of instructing, stimulating and signal transmitting. From the point of view of game theory, this paper suggests that the vohmtary environmental policy is a tendency in environmental policy development for it an relax the predicament in its imbalanced cost and benefit in environment regulation.