大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据

Controlling Shareholder's Tunneling and Resistant Powers: The Evidence From Chinese Stock Market

本文的研究发现第一大股东存在隧道效应和壕沟防御效应,但不存在利益协同效应;企业集团作为大股东进行隧道挖掘,其效应更为明显。第二大股东能起到抑制第一大股东渠道挖掘的作用,但当机构投资者作为第二大股东时,与第一大股东一样有隧道挖掘效应。相比之下,第三大股东更能代表中小股东的利益。独立董事在关联交易方面对大股东有抑制作用,在其他方面虽有抑制作用,但不显著。配股动机和达标动机分别反映出隧道效应的前置和后置信号。

The research shows that the first largest controlling shareholder has the tunneling and entrenchment effects, but does not have alignment effects; the group enterprises as the first largest controlling shareholder have much more statistical significance in tunneling effects. The second largest controlling shareholders have motivations to curb such tunneling effects, but when they are institution investors, having the same tunneling effects just as the first largest controlling shareholders behave. The third largest controlling shareholders are relatively much more effective in representing the interests of median-small shareholders. Independent directors have obvious functions in reducing associated transactions made by first largest controlling shareholder, and they also have some functions in controlling the behaviors of first largest controlling shareholders, but not significance statistically. The motivations for issuing new stock shares and making the minimal positive profit to satisfy the regulatory standards and investor＇s requirements convey the forward and backward information respectively.