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凸随机合作对策的核心 被引量:3

Core of Convex Stochastic Cooperative Game
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摘要 本文将凸性扩展到随机合作对策中,从而得到凸随机合作对策具有超可加性与非空的核心,且凸随机合作对策的核心满足Minkowski和与Minkowski差。 This paper extends notions of superadditivity and convexity to stochastic cooperative games. It is shown that convex games are superadditive and have nonempty cores, and that the core of convex stochastic cooperative game satisfies the Minkowski sum and Minkowski difference.
机构地区 燕山大学理学院
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 2005年第5期59-62,共4页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 河北省自然科学基金资助项目(A2005000301) 河北省教育厅资助项目(2004468)
关键词 随机合作对策 核心 Minkowski和 凸性 随机变量 stochastic cooperative game core Minkowski sum convexity stochastic variety
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参考文献7

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