中国医院服务产业的信息经济学分析

An Information Economic Analysis of China's Hospital Service Industry

患者(委托人)出于信任,将治疗自身疾病的权利暂时授予了医生(代理人),但由于委托人和代理人目标不一致,拥有专业技术知识的医生有可能会滥用这种权利,从而损害患者的权益。不可观察性或不可证实性,导致了第三方仲裁的不可能性。好的医疗制度应该将选择的权利赋予处于信息劣势的一方。医生收入偏低,未充分体现其人力资本投资和风险报酬,结果造成人力资本投资不足,也降低了医生违规的机会成本。

Out of trust the patient （the client） trust the cure of his disease to the doctor （the trustee）. Yet disagreement of objectives of the two parties renders the possibility of the doctor＇ s abusing this trust to the detriment of the patient＇s interest. Inability to observe or confirm contributes to the inability for third - part arbitration. Good medical regime should grant the disadvantaged party choice. The income of medical professionals does not match their human capital investment and the risk compensation, which lead to insufficient human capital investment and lowers the opportunity cost of doctor＇s rule violation.