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论渔业自然资源特性对ITQ制度交易成本的影响

An Analysis of the Features of Natural Resources of Marine Fisheries and their Influences upon the Transaction Costs of Individual Transferable Quota System in China
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摘要 本文在阐述我国海洋捕捞渔业自然资源特性的基础上,通过剖析它对个体可转让配额制度交易成本的影响,提出相应建议:我国单一鱼种产量低的特征会使得渔民在遵守该制度时的守法者成本上升;海洋生物组成复杂多样的特征会使当局确定总可捕量的信息搜寻成本、分配配额的决策成本和执行成本上升,会使渔民因兼捕性增强而需要为完成交易多付固定交易成本、信息搜寻成本和讨价还价成本;资源的地域差异性较大一方面将增加专用资产的投资而增加交易成本,另一方面将降低区域间配额分配难度而降低交易成本;海域的宽阔和海岸带广延性将导致当局的监督成本增加。 The features of natural resources of marine capturing fisheries in China were discussed in this paper, and then their influences on the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system were analyzed, countermeasures to reduce the transaction costs were advised. It was pointed out that the lower yield of each specie of fishes will increase the costs for the obedience of fishermen, the comprehensive component of marine fishes will increase the information costs, decision making costs, and enforcement costs of the administrators, this kind of component will also increase fishermen's fixed transaction costs, information costs, and negotiation costs. It was also illustrated that the apparent difference among the fishing areas will increase the fixed transaction costs on one side, and cut down the distribution costs of quotas on the other side, but the wide ocean area and long coastal line will certainly increase the monitoring costs of individual transferable quota system in China.
出处 《中国渔业经济》 2005年第5期25-28,共4页 Chinese Fisheries Economics
基金 上海市重点学科(第二期)"渔业经济与管理"专项基金(项目编号LT1103) 上海水产大学校长基金(项目号科04-099)
关键词 海洋渔业 自然资源 个体可转让配额制度 交易成本 Marine Fisheries Natural Resources Individual Transferable Quota System Transaction Costs
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参考文献11

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