摘要
克尔恺郭尔认为人的有限性(即本文称为肉身的方面)与人的无限性(一种纵深扩张的想象力)是不可调和的,在具体的生存过程中,这不可调和的两方面转化为必然性与可能性之间的对立。克尔恺郭尔通过分析焦虑概念揭示出生存中的非存在(non-being)是有限性与无限性、可能性与必然性不可调和的根源。而克尔恺郭尔的主体性正是面对非存在的主体性,从而是面对绝对的他者而生存的激情。与建立在有限性与无限性、可能性与必然性内在统一基础上的黑格尔的主体性概念相比,克尔恺郭尔的主体性是肉身的主体性,同时以绝对他者的绝对主体性为前提,而黑格尔的主体性是一种抽象的无肉身的主体性。克尔恺郭尔的主体性概念是一种灵性叙事,而黑格尔的主体性概念是一种宏大叙事。
To Kierkegaard, the finitude, understood as the body of the self in this paper, and the infinitude, the so-called inward imagination in Kierkegaard' s text, is in absolute contradiction. In the process of existence, these two elements of the self can be viewed as the necessity and the possibility. Through analysing the phenomenon of anxiety, Kierkegaard points out that there is non-being in the process of existence. This nonbeing makes it impossible to harmonize the finitude and the infinitude, the necessity and possibility. The subjectivity of Kierkegaard is the passion to exist in face of this non-being. Compared with the notion of subjectivity of Hegel, which is based on the unification of the finitude and the infinitude, the necessity and the possibility, the subjectivity of Kierkegaard is that of the body, with the presupposition of the absolute other as the absolute subjectivity, while Hegel's subjectivity is abstract and without body. In one word, the notion of Kierkegaard' s subjectivity is a kind of spiritual narrative and Hegel' s is a kind of great narrative.
出处
《复旦学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第6期60-67,共8页
Fudan Journal(Social Sciences)
关键词
肉身
纵深想象力
非存在
主体性
绝对他者
焦虑
承受
body
inward imagination
non-being
subjectivity
the absolute other
anxiety
suffer