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现代契约经济学的企业边界决定理论:比较和评述

Enterprise Boundary Determination Theory of Modern Contract Economics: Comparison and Comments
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摘要 包括Klein的自我履约机制,Grossman,Hart and Moore的资产配置理论和Rajan&Zin-gales的“进入权”理论在内的现代契约理论在不完全契约的框架下,通过引入可占用准租、资产剩余控制权和进入权等重要概念,较好地解释了企业边界决定问题,但却没有得出最大化准租的企业边界是最佳的企业边界这一应有的结论。最大化准租是交易双方多重复合交易的成果,在这一最终目的指引下,契约安排的不同形式及其所决定的企业边界的多样性,为现实中的企业调整边界和实施战略管理提供了理论依据。 The modern contract economics including klein' s self-enforcing mechanism, assets disposition theory of Grossman, Hart and Moore and access fights of Rajan & Zingales resolves preferably the problem theoretically and practically about the determination of enterprise boundary in frame of incomplete contract by introducing the conceptions on appropriable quasi-rents, assets residual control rights and access rights, but it did not come to the logical conclusion: the first-best boundary of enterprise is the boundary of maximizing quasi- rents. Maximized quasi-rents are the results of multiple exchanges on both sides, and in the direction of this final goal, the different forms of contractual arrangement and the determined diversity of the boundary of the firm provide theoretical evidences on enterprises regulating their boundaries realistically and implementing strategy management.
作者 徐忠爱
出处 《广东商学院学报》 2005年第5期76-81,96,共7页 Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
关键词 契约经济学 企业边界 不完全契约 关系性契约 contract economics enterprise boundary incomplete contract relational contract
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参考文献21

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