摘要
以非对称信息博弈及委托-代理理论为理论背景,分析了工程采购代理成本的产生、组成及内涵关系,并对最优激励合同的设计、最优监督策略及其成本做了分析说明。
Based on asymmetric information game and principal-agent theory, by analyzing the forming reasons and connotation relationships of agency costs which occurs during the process of engineering project procurement, this paper gives out the model of best contract and monitor mechanism. It also analyses the relationships between the monitor mechanism and incentive mechanism.
出处
《中国工程科学》
2005年第11期66-71,共6页
Strategic Study of CAE
关键词
工程采购
代理成本
非对称信息博弈
委托-代理理论
engineering procurement
agency cost
asymmetric information game
principal-agent theory
