出租车燃气行为与政府政策的博弈分析

Analysis on a Game Model of Taxi and Government's Behavior

以发展城市清洁汽车为背景,通过建立完全信息动态博弈模型,描述了追求个体利益最大化的出租司机和社会福利最大化的政府这两种不同利益主体的行为特征,揭示了政府补贴政策和加气出租车比例的相互影响关系,求出子博弈精炼纳什均衡解,并讨论了其他因素对这一均衡结果的影响,得到相应的结论。

The interrelationship of taxi＇ gas behavior and government policy are discussed. According to different interests, the objectives of them are about maximizing one＇s benefits and maximizing social welfare separately. A dynamic game model is built to describe their interactive behavior and a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is found which is about rate of gas taxi and government subsidy policy. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn, these will be helpful for government to make policy.