中央政府与地方政府的金融资源配置权博弈

The Game of the Co-allocation of Financial Resources by Central Government with Local Governments

中国的金融资源配置经历了一个中央政府集中配置到中央政府与地方政府共同配置的过程。在现有的中央政府配置金融资源的成本与收益条件下,中央政府与地方政府共同配置金融资源成为博弈的纳什均衡。这一博弈结果意味着提高金融资源配置效率可以在不改变国有金融制度的产权结构下,通过扶植(或至少不压制)非国有金融机构来实现。

The allocation of financial resom-ces in China has undergone a process of from central government allocation to the co-allocation of central government with the local governments. Under the present condition of central government allocating the cost and benefit of financial resources, the co-allocation of financial resources by central government with local governments has become the Nash equilibrium of the game. This result of the game means that the improvement of the efficiency of allocating financial resources could be realized, under the condition of not changing the property structure of state financial system, by supporting （at least not suppressing） the non-state financial institutions.