摘要
文章运用委托代理理论,分析了公立医院现行治理结构中特殊的委托代理问题,这些问题包括多委托人、委托人的多目标、委托人和代理人之间的效用函数不一致、难以分别评价公立医院代理人的经营成果和医疗服务提供成果等,由此导致难以建立有效的绩效评估体系。随后分析了公立医院实现有效治理的条件,指出在目前的条件下,我国尚不具备广泛推行公益法人治理结构的条件,目前应该全面规范公立医院的自主化改革。
Basea on the principal-agent theory, the special principal-agent problems of the governance structure of public hospital were analyzed. These problems were the multi-clients, the multi-aims of client, the inconsistent of utility function between client and deputy, the difficulty of evaluating the operation production and health treatment supplement production respectively, etc. Therefore, it was hard to establish an effective performance evaluation system. The conditions which could realize the effective management of public hospital was revealed, by now, we did not have the conditions to extend the public interests corporation, and we should regularize the public hospital's autonomy transformation widely.
出处
《中国医院管理》
北大核心
2005年第8期19-23,共5页
Chinese Hospital Management
基金
美国中华医学基金(CM B)资助
北京大学卫生政策与管理研究中心招标课题"我国公立医院治理结构研究"的分报告之一
关键词
委托代理理论
公立医院
治理结构
绩效评估
principal-agent theory
public hospital
governance structure
performance evaluation