风险投资退出的博弈分析

A Game Analysis on Venture Capital Exit

在风险投资退出时,风险投资股份的购买者之间存在信息不对称现象。在分析了风险投资退出的几种主要方式的基础上,探讨了风险投资退出时风险企业与风险投资家之间的博弈均衡。分析结果表明,无论风险企业是否达到IPO退出条件,风险投资家和风险企业之间是否签订回购协议以及回购协议中约定的违约费用的大小是影响博弈均衡结果的主要因素。

There is asymmetric information among all the purchasers of venture capital stock during the venture capital exit. On the basis of the analysis of venture capital exit strategy, this paper analyzed the game equilibrium between venture enterprises and venture capitalists. According to the analysis, the main factors influencing the game equilibrium are whether the buyback agreement is signed between venture enterprises and venture capitalists,the sum of punishment,and whether venture enterprises satisfy the requirement of IPO.