上市公司股权再融资偏好的非理性成因研究

Irrationality and Preference of Listed Companies Equity Refinance

大量理论分析和实证研究表明:上市公司应该避免采用股权再融资方式筹集资金,以减少对公司价值产生的负面影响,但至今国内外特别是我国仍有不少上市公司偏好这一方式。本文尝试运用行为金融学理论,从投资者非理性的角度对此进行解释。结论是非理性的噪音交易者制造了公司管理者利用股权再融资的“时机窗口”,而我国不合理的制度背景,产生了更为严重的非理性行为,造成了我国上市公司强烈的股权再融资偏好。

It has been indicated by many researchers theoretically or empirically that seasoned equity offerings have negative effect on the corporate value. Therefore the listed companies should avoid using this approach to raise fund. On the contrary, quite many prefer this very route in reality, especially for the Chinese listed companies. We believe there must be some theoretical explanations for this. With this belief we try to interpret it through the investors＇ irrationality approach of the behavior financing theory. Our analysis demonstrates that it is the existence of noise traders that produces “the windows of opportunity” for the corporations to issue seasoned equities. And in China, the present institutional illogicality worsens this irrationality. As a result, the listed companies have greater interest in this seasoned equity offerings.